| TT: Welcome to our first live chat with guest Luis Guillermo Solís. Please send him your questions about how CAFTA could change Costa Rica.
Q: First, what is your stance on CAFTA? Did you support it in the nationwide referendum last month?
A: I opposed CAFTA and continue to do so. In my opinion, this free-trade agreement imposes a number of inconvenient demands on Costa Rica and ultimately threatens its possibilities to continue developing in a context of fair and equitable social and political relations. I do not oppose free trade per se, but think CAFTA goes far beyond a conventional understanding of what a treaty in this field entails. The significant asymmetries that already exist between the U.S. and Central America will increase as a result of CAFTA and this will have a direct and lasting impact on the region's development.
Q: Now that Costa Ricans have voted in favor of CAFTA, how soon is it likely to go into effect?
A: It will take a while. You ought to remember that in order for CAFTA to go into effect, the country has to approve 11 so called “implementation” laws (including several treaties) that require 38 votes – a qualified majority – at the Legislative Assembly. My guess is that the official block will do as much as it can to expedite the approval of these laws, but even then it will take several months before all the legal and constitutional consultations take place. Even then, I am sure that the intention of the Costa Rican government and its legislators is to have everything in place by March 1, 2008.
Q: What laws are most pressing for the legislature to pass so that the country can take full advantage of CAFTA's benefits and avoid its risks?
A: Probably all of them. One of the problems with CAFTA (and all treaties, for that matter) is that they have to be either accepted or rejected “in totto.” So is also the case for the implementation agenda (the pending laws in the Legislative Assembly). Hence, we either pass them all by March 1, or Costa Rica will not be able to join CAFTA and eventually partake from its supposed benefits. In my opinion, the only way to really take advantage of CAFTA is by putting in place a true “national development agenda” including significant reforms in such fields as education, the treasury (a tax overhaul), the environment, employment and the state. This agenda is not at hand even when the government claims it is already being implemented as part of the National Development Plan. In fact, I don't think it will be possible to imagine a reform of this magnitude unless the opponent to CAFTA put their political act together and press the Arias administration to negotiate with its legislative opposition in Congress.
Q: How should Costa Rica reform its education system (if at all) so that young people can take advantage of the new job opportunities created by foreign companies such as Continental AG coming here?
A: This is probably one of the most sensitive and fundamental areas where the country will have to take the lead. Currently, almost half of all the Costa Rican students of high school age are NOT attending classes. This is mostly explained by economic reasons (they have to help their families to increase their income), but it also means that the system is not working in terms of being interesting and useful to our young people. In my view, if we are not able to change this situation in the very near future, most of the benefits of CAFTA, other than exploiting our cheap labor force, will rapidly fade away. Just a couple of week ago I was talking with CEO's of information technology-related companies in Central America and they were extremely concerned about Costa Rica's capacity to continue providing the qualified labor force they require. Thus, it is urgent that something is done to this regard probably with the support of public and private universities, but also institutions such as INA and other mid-level and technical educational facilities.
Q: How has the referendum changed democracy in Costa Rica ? Do Costa Ricans no longer have faith in the Legislative Assembly, and will there be more referendums to come on big issues like CAFTA?
A: Costa Rican democracy has been changing for at least the past two decades. CAFTA has only accelerated this transition from the so-called “Welfare State” model into something else, probably resembling a more open, less compassionate system where the market is not as regulated as one would wish in a modern capitalistic context such as the US' or Western Europe's. At any rate, my impression is that the changes brought upon the country by the referendum and in more general terms, by CAFTA, have deepened citizen awareness but also have raised very serious concerns regarding the capacity of state legal institutions (such as the Supreme Tribunal of Elections or the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court) to operate fairly for all the parties involved. This delegitamizing of institutions that used to be regarded as fair judges of political relations in the country has been furthered by a widespread sensation that political parties are no longer responding to their traditional functions. Public and private corruption as well as mistrust toward the political elite are also pretty much central to country's contemporary political debate. CAFTA therefore, can NOT be blamed for all of these dysfunctions. Yet, it is now part of the country's political reality and in my view its approval has only worsened the trends of political disarray Costa Rica has had for a number of years.
Q: Is the anti-CAFTA movement divided? What new form will it take, if any?
A: Yes, it is divided because it was never united to begin with. The anti-CAFTA group is a very broad, loose and pluralistic coalition formed by unions, NGOs, churches and other religious associations, intellectuals, environmentalists, citizen action committees, small and medium size business and so on. It never had a centralized leadership and it never function on the basis of a unique platform. As part of our experience during the referendum campaign, we did develop a very basic structure that ensured minimum levels of political coordination, but once the referendum took place, most organizations went back to their own fields of work and we are now trying to articulate them again. My impression is that this process will take a while. Tomorrow a very large assembly will take place in Zapote where most of these groups will meet again for the first time since the Referendum to discuss common and not-so-common positions regarding the implementation agenda and other issues. This could be the beginning of a new phase of harmonized actions regarding CAFTA and its aftermath.
Q: This was the country's first referendum. Are we likely to see them become a trend?
A: I hope so. Referenda are useful instruments to enhance democratic participation. Having said this though, it is also true that this particular one took longer and was more imperfect than the ones we hope to have in the future. Among other reasons for this, the referendum law is very, very imperfect. It is indispensable to modify it so that some of the abuses committed during this first experience are not repeated in the future (I refer to finance regulations, government involvement, and other such issues). Yet, all in all the experience was very successful in terms of citizen participation and it is likely that it will help CR to move on some issues that otherwise would probably never be considered by the political elites in the Legislative Assembly.
Q: How soon can we expect the state monopolies to be privatized, and how will this affect the country?
A: According to the Arias administration and CAFTA supporters in general, state monopolies will NOT be privatized with CAFTA, but would be “opened to private competition” as soon as the implementation agenda is approved. Technically speaking, this opening would occur as soon as CAFTA enters into effect on March 1, 2008. As far as I can tell, if this date is kept, it will probably take a few months before the so-called “ICE strengthening law” is enacted including the creation of the “ superintendencia de telecomunicaciones. ” In real time, the opening of state monopolies will probably take a couple of years or so.
Q: Taking into account that many international business would like to come to Costa Rica, how could it affect Costa Rica the fact that there's a lack of bilingual Costa Ricans? Could those new companies bring their own staffers and leaving Costa Ricans without a chance to work with them?
A: Again, this is crucial. Bilingualism is a MUST and it will have to come about as a result of a massive public education effort. Bilingualism in a country that is already receiving 2 million tourists a year is no longer a choice but a reality that needs to be address through good quality public policies.
Q: You say 11 implementation laws, but some papers talk about 13. Why is that?
A: The ll law number was just released yesterday by the Ministry of Trade (COMEX). As far as I can tell from their estimation, 13 was a number that included CAFTA itself (now approved), and also another law that is not part of the implementation agenda per se. So, the official number is now 11 laws.
Q: During the pre-referendum debates and talks, pro-CAFTA people affirmed that Costa Rican natural resources were saved. However, the week after the referendum, the government announced that it exchanged three of the most important National Parks for the debt with the United States. Are Costa Rican loosing those parks, does it mean that they do not belong to us? Can the United States come and make use of those parks?
A: No, we are not loosing the parks nor the U.S.-CR deal seem to affect our national park system negatively. All to the contrary. I regard this to be a very positive contribution to our national conservation system which as you know suffers from chronic financial deficits (it is unbelievable but true!). This considered, I do believe CAFTA could affect our national parks if the regulations regarding the environment are not taken care of. Guanacaste and other coastal areas are already suffering from very serious environmental problems related to massive infrastructure investments that are currently taking place near and around very sensitive protected areas (Tamarindo-Playa Grande is a good example of this), and I do fear that large real state interests will continue to impose on those areas as the country opens up to investors from the U.S. in the coming years.
Q: There was a huge opposition movement to CAFTA. Are we likely to see future free-trade agreements met with the same level of opposition?
A: I surely hope so. Again, it is not a question of opposing free trade altogether (although I would personally wish we could develop more and better FAIR TRADE practices in the future), but to ensure that whatever free-trade agreements we have are more equitable and safeguard some of our vital political and social interests. The opposition to CAFTA is larger than CAFTA. Most of us are not satisfied with the current state of affairs in the country nor are convinced that the unrestrained reign of the free market will suffice to take care of most of our people's needs. Thus, above and beyond CAFTA we are likely to continue pressing for large scale economic and political reforms, as it is has been the case in many democratic countries everywhere.
Q: But who in Costa Rica knows enough about a big issue like CAFTA to make an informed decision about it?
A: I grant you that not many people (either in favor or against it) really knew what CAFTA was all about. This was probably one of the biggest concerns some of us had regarding “throwing” the issue to the public in a Referendum that was ill-informed to being with. Yet, it is also true that a lot of people made a tremendous effort to learn about CAFTA along the campaigning leading to the Referendum and that popular knowledge of some of the agreement's implications improved quite a bit with time.
Q: Can you talk about the erosion of support for the PLN within the universities since the 1960s?
A: Erosion of PLN support in the universities and everywhere else results from the middle sectors abandoning the party as a result of its economic policies during the last 20 years. If you remember, the Costa Rican “middle class” was born of the 1940's and became politically significant as a result of the PLN's strategy of fostering the Welfare State during the 1950's and 1960's. Don Pepe's magic was his capacity to articulate all these sectors -both rural and urban- into a political movement that was progressive on its consequences yet conservative in its ideology. With time, the social understandings supporting the party started to fail and ultimately the middle class became "sacrificed" by the structural adjustment practices of the 1980's and 1990's. The abandonment of the PLN in the university sector, the “exile of the national intelligentsia” to other organizations such as PAC, are part of that phenomenon but have found similar experiences among teachers, small and middle size entrepreneurs and other such groups. In a more personal vein, other departures such as mine resulted from serious moral questionings regarding party practices (like in internal elections).
Q: How has this referendum changed Costa Rica's democratic system?
A: I think it was made it look clearly incapable of withstanding a sustained political transition. If the ruling groups in CR do not realize that the political system we currently have is insufficient to address the changing nature of the country's social challenges, we will be in deep trouble in a few years. One of the most positive consequences of the referendum is that it revealed some of the most blatant perversions of democracy and thus opened the possibility of undertaking deep reforms to avoid them in the future. Frankly though, I am not optimistic about the ruling elite's capacity to undertake such deep reform and therefore count on the organized and peaceful pressure of the people in order to obtain it.
Q: The CAFTA referendum ruined several careers, including that of former Vice-President Kevin Casas. Did anyone come out of the referendum looking particularly good?
A: Yes, on both sides. The Referendum forced a lot of very valuable new leaders to come out to defend their respective causes, and it showed! I hope that a good number of them will participate in the next (2010) election seeking public office. I do regret that we did not see as many new women leaders as we should have been able to witness given their brilliant contributions in most matters pertaining to the CAFTA agenda, but this is part of a larger, nationwide problem.
Q: Are the anti-CAFTA community organizations, or comites patrioticas, going to hold any real political power? What kind of effect will they have on the decision-making process here?
A: This is a mystery. We will have to wait and see. The “ comites patrioticos " are very interesting and unprecedented political phenomena and therefore we have no idea about how they will develop from now on. My impression is that some of them are already very strong and politically-capable, while other will in all likelihood disappear as their members go back to their original action bases. All in all I find a lot of commitment in most “ comites patrioticos ” and it is possible that they will remain very active for a while. In fact, some of my friends in the NO camp believe that “ comites patrioticos ” are the germ from which the new Costa Rican political system will spring. I think it is still too early to say.
Q: Why do you think there was a change in Guanacaste which supported Arias in the presidential election but didn't for CAFTA? Do you think it is related to the fact that areas where there are many foreigners (Garabito, Quepos, Guanacaste) saw No win?
A: Yes. In many ways Guacanaste is how Costa Rica will look like if CAFTA is successful. As you probably know, the province of Guanacaste is the one with the highest per capita investment ratio in the country, but also one of the poorest in Human Development terms. This is the result of bad planning, public and private corruption, lack of reasonable but strict environmental regulations, and an economic model that does not privilege public-private associations to ensure a better distribution of wealth and the benefits of economic prosperity. My impression is that guanacastecos voted against CAFTA because deep inside they know that this is not a good road for the rest of the country to follow. It may be more complicated than that, but it is clear to me that the Guanacaste example remains a very relevant test-case that CR should use to prevent some very negative impacts from CAFTA in the future. |
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