Previous perspectives

By Carlos Denton

Whenever Daniel Ortega leaves the presidential compound in Managua, the first traffic circle he encounters is dedicated to the “Huehuense,” the multi-faced indigenous figure of mythology. The underlying theme of this creature is that Nicaraguans rarely reveal their true “face” and posture their dialogue and responses according to their perception of the person they are interacting with. 

Most public-opinion surveys are now showing Daniel Ortega receiving 56 percent of voting intention in the November presidential elections, with opposition candidates receiving at best 18 percent between the four of them. According to these surveys, about one in four voters remains undecided. On Election Day, if proportions presented by polling companies are correct, Ortega will win with a landslide victory of 75 percent.

Could this really be possible? Are three in four voters 16 years of age and older so satisfied with Ortega’s government that they wish to retain him for another five years as president? Or is the high voting intention registered in some surveys partly a product of the Huehuense cultural phenomenon?

Most communities now host “Citizen Power Committees,” or CPC, which are organized by the state and used as channels for food, sometimes cash, building materials and medical supplies for residents. And, of course, they also serve as instruments for political control. More than 150,000 CPC members receive varied types of assistance from the Ortega government, financed of course by his Venezuelan benefactor Hugo Chávez.  

CPCs also serve as  “neighborhood watch” organizations, and a person openly supportive of an anti-Sandinista presidential candidate could well expect to have problems in receiving government subsidies. When asked in surveys if they “feel safe” to publicly criticize the Ortega administration, including talking to journalists, three in five respondents said no. When pollsters come around, it is probable that a considerable number of respondents say they prefer Ortega but really have no intention of voting for him.

In the 1990 elections, most pollsters had Ortega winning by a landslide. He lost and spent 16 years clawing his way back to power. He now openly states to whoever listens that “those elections were stolen from me,” and, “I will not permit this to happen again.”

CID/Gallup was the only research firm that published results prior to the 1990 elections showing a victory for Violeta de Chamorro, Ortega’s opponent, and it is currently the only one registering support for Ortega at 42 percent, rather than the much higher number reported by other companies. Opposition leader Fabio Gadea enjoys a 34 percent voting intention and Arnoldo Alemán 11 percent. The other two candidates mark less than one percent combined.

It is clear that if the opposition continues to be divided, Ortega will win the election.  Projecting these numbers, he would receive 48 percent on Election Day, a comfortable lead for a person running for president in a country with high levels of unemployment and poverty and offering little or no hope for advancement of young people.

How does CID/Gallup protect itself from the Huehuense factor?  The company uses foreign interviewers, clearly identified as such, and a simulated secret ballot procedure.  Respondents, hearing the foreign accents, are not concerned that the survey is really a CPC-sponsored project designed to check up on them, and are more likely to respond accurately as to their intentions.

It is universally accepted that the 1990 elections were honest, and that Ortega, lulled into complacency by all the surveys that said he would win, (New York Times and ABC News, among others) did not intervene in the electoral process. He truly thought he was going to win. 

Now surveys reveal that there are some considerable doubts about the honesty of the voting scheduled for this year. Ortega stacked the Supreme Court to ensure that he would be “exempted” from the constitutional prohibition of his immediate reelection. He has also stacked the Supreme Electoral Council CSE with party stalwarts to insure that he can exert control over the vote counts at the end of the day.  

If Ortega and his electoral team are planning for widespread fraud in the electoral process, such as there was in municipal voting in 2008, there is an important consideration that they must take into account. Nicaragua receives a substantial amount of foreign aid as one of the three poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere. With the exception of money from Venezuela, most comes from western-style, functioning democracies. Will donor nations, including the United States, Canada, Japan and the European Union “believe” a landslide for Ortega of 75 percent of votes cast? Would they continue to provide aid if the fraud simply is too apparent to ignore?   

If fraud is planned, it has to be “fine-tuned” and based on “real” polling data; computers have to be programmed early on to “double count” some votes and this can be done with reliable current data. How reliable is the data Ortega might use to set up vote fraud, taking into account the Huehuense factor?

Carlos Denton is cofounder of CID/Gallup, which operates a full-service research operation in Managua, Nicaragua.